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THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF PROTECTING ONE'S
COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE
WHAT THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY HAS DONE TO PROTECT ITS RIGHTS, AND
WHETHER THIS IS A BENEFICIAL STRATEGY FOR
THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER AND SOCIETY

Sally L. Parker*
Introduction
From its very beginnings this country has provided for copyright protection, as written in
the Constitution, "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."' Such protection for the creative works of authors is intended to ensure they
receive compensation for their works, and thus can continue creating. 2 It is unlikely our
forefathers could have ever imagined the conflicts that would arise with the advancement of
technology, particularly in the digital age.
Over the past decade the advancement of Internet technology has led to faster methods of
transmitting data and the capability of creating near-perfect copies of sound and visual
information with little to no deterioration in their quality.3 This advancement has caused an
uproar in the entertainment industry, specifically within the music and movie businesses, over
how to protect creative copyrighted works in cyberspace. 4 Unlike the Copyright infringement
concerns of old, the current infringing activity is of particular concern to the music and movie
industries because many of their potential customers, particularly those of the younger
generation, do not consider such online activity illegal or, at least, not as bad as stealing a
compact disc ("CD") from a retail store. 5 In an attempt to combat this view, the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) has begun educational campaigns to inform consumers
that their music-sharing activities may be illegal.6

*

J.D. Candidate 2007, The George Washington University Law School; B.A., International Relations, Johns
Hopkins University (2000). 1would like to thank Professor Dawn C. Nunziato for her guidance and advice. A
special thank you to my husband Mark for his support and encouragement.
U.S. Const. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 8.

2

Jessica Litman, Sharing andStealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 32 (2004).

3 Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 115 (2003). See

4

Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 12B.01 [C] (2002); Seth D. Greenstein, The
Consumer's Right to Listen to DigitalMusic, 640 PLI/Pat 349, 353 (2001).

id.

5 See Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Tone Deqf to a Moral Dilemma? Millions DownloadSongs Illegally But Don't Feel

Guilty, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003, at A1; Christopher Yasiejko, DownloadingEthics, NEWS J. (Wilmington,
Del.), Oct. 14, 2003, at A4.
6 See, e.g., Recording Indus. Assn. of Am., Copyright Educational Efforts,

http:i'www.riaa.com/issues/educationidefault.asp (accessed Aug. 8, 2005).
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Previously, in the analog era, the music industry did not perceive the making of copies of
purchased music by an individual as problematic as file-sharing. 7 Not only did the sound quality
degenerate as multiple copies were produced, but it was unlikely that an individual would make
more than a few copies of an album for personal use or to distribute to a couple friends. 8 Today,
in the digital age, an individual who has purchased an album has the capability through peer-topeer networks to have that copy duplicated thousands of times, with hardly any reduction in
sound quality to the initial recording.
The dangers of such mass distribution have sent copyright owners searching frantically
for ways to prevent, and eventually put a stop to, such behavior. This paper will begin with an
examination of the attempts by the RIAA to obtain individual information through Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) for those they believed to be committing mass amounts of online
copyright infringement. When this strategy was denied by the courts under the protections of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), copyright owners sought other, more substantial
and cost-effective measures to stop online copyright infringers by going after the source, the
software companies that created the software which enable peer-to-peer networks.
Once the efforts by the RIAA to gain access to individual user's information through
ISPs were prevented by the DMCA, its main tactic was to go after the peer-to-peer network
providers in an attempt to shut down the system that enabled file-sharers to infringe on its
copyrights. 9 The second part of this paper will examine the empirical findings of the effects of
online sharing on the sale of music albums and how these new findings might effect the
decisions made in the online music swapping cases.
The RIAA, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), and numerous
recording companies have waged a multi-pronged attack against online copyright infringement.
Their goal: To inform the younger generation that online music "sharing" of copyrighted
material is illegal without express permission 10 and to shut down the software companies that
make such networks and such sharing possible." The danger in seeking such massive protection
of copyrighted works is that it stops all activity, including the distribution of works that are not
copyrighted, are within the realm of public use, or that authors have given express permission to
be shared, while at the same time stifling technological innovation. 12 The initial attempts by the
RIAA to obtain internet users' information was thwarted by the court's interpretation of
legislation passed in an attempt to protect the providers of internet service through the DMCA.

7 Steven A. Hetcher, Curb Center Special Feature: The Music Industry's FailedAttemptto Influence File Sharing,

Norms, 7
15.

8 Id. at

VAND.

J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 10, 14 (2004).

9 In reAimster Copy.. Litig.. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&MRecs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021
(9th Cir. 2001); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
10 See Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning In: The Future of Copyright Protectionfor Online Music in the Digital
Millennium, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 2445, 2446 (2000).
11In reAimster Copy.. Litig.. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&MRecs., Inc. v. Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021
(9th Cir. 2001); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
12 See, Itza Wilson, Online Music DistributionCompromise: Protectingthe Artist's Copyright While Not Stifling
Digital Development, 2001 SYRACUSE L. & TECH. J. 3 (2001).
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I. The Purpose of the DMCA, and the RIAA Attempts to
Misuse the Subpoena Provisions of § 512(h).
Section 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted to protect
ISPs from liability for copyright infringement committed by customers using its networks. 13 The
hope was to limit the crippling effects of monetary liability for copyright infringement where the
ISP was not involved in the infringing activity, thereby enabling ISPs to continue operating. 14 If
these safe harbor provisions had not been enacted, there would be very few ISPs that could
afford to remain in business.15 Without the DMCA, the higher cost of operating an ISP resulting
from copyright-infringement liability would be passed onto the consumer, making it more
difficult and prohibitively expensive for people to access the Internet.
ISPs must first have a termination policy for repeat infringers and must inform their
subscribers and account holders of this policy to qualify for protection under the DMCA.16 ISPs
must not interfere with the reasonable measures copyright owners take to protect their
copyrighted works or identify their copyrighted works on the Internet. 17 Once an ISP has met
these two conditions for eligibility, there are four areas under § 512 for which they are provided
immunity: (1) transitory digital network communications, (2) system caching, (3) information
stored on systems or networks controlled by the users, and (4) information location tools.18 The
first safe harbor for ISPs, immunity for transitory digital network communications, means that an
ISP cannot be found liable for copyright infringement where it is acting as a mere conduit for
information being shared between users. 19 The second safe harbor, immunity from liability for
system caching, protects ISPs from liability where there is an intermediate or temporary storage
of material on their system or network.2 0 The third instance where ISPs are shielded from
liability is for information residing on its systems or networks that is at the direction of its users.
The ISP is protected so long as it does not have actual knowledge that the distribution of the
material is infringing a copyright, does not receive financial benefit from the infringing activity,
and moves quickly once notified of the infringing material to remove or deny access to the
material. 2 1 The final safe harbor provision is where an ISP uses information location tools such
as a "directory, index, reference point, or hypertext link., 22 Additionally, ISPs must not initiate
the transmittal of copyrighted work, select the material or recipients, make a copy of the
copyrighted material, or modify the contents of the copyrighted material being transmitted.2
The DMCA requires that ISPs do not have actual knowledge that the material on its network is
infringing a copyright and must act quickly to remove any infringing material z4

1317 U.S.C.§ 512(h) (2005). Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 12B.01 [C] (2002);
Commerce Rep. (DMCA), p.49. See S. Rep. (DMCA), p.40.
14S. Rep. (DMCA), p.8.
15id.
16§ 512(i)(1)(A) (2005).
17§ 512(i)(1)(B).

" § 512(a)- (d).
'9§ 512(a).
20 § 512(b).
21 § 512(c).
22

§ 512(d).

23 § 512(a).

24

§ 512(c).
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The subpoena provision enables a copyright owner, or a person authorized to act on the
25
owner's behalf, to request a subpoena from the clerk to identify an alleged copyright infringer.
The provision requires that the copyright owner submit a sworn declaration stating their belief
that the individual, whose information they are seeking, is infringing upon their copyrighted
material. 26 This puts enormous power in the hands of the copyright owner to act with good
faith, with negligible judicial oversight.
A. The RIAA 's Use of the Subpoena Provision.
The RIAA attempted to use the subpoena provisions of the DMCA in July 2002 and
February 2003 when it subpoenaed Verizon Internet Services to determine the identities of two
alleged copyright infringers using KaZaa peer-to-peer software. 2 7 Verizon argued that the
alleged infringing material was transmitted through their network and not stored on it, thus
falling outside the parameters of the subpoena powers provided for in § 512(h). 28 The district
court granted RIAA's motion to uphold the subpoena and rejected Verizon's argument. 2' The
D.C. Circuit consolidated the two actions and found that under the DMCA a subpoena may be
issued only where the ISP was storing the alleged infringing material. 30 Where two users merely
use an ISP as a method for communicating, the ISP cannot be subpoenaed for the users'
identities because no infringing information was actually stored on the ISP's server. 31 The Court
reasoned that the requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A) that an ISP "remove" or "disable access to"
alleged infringing material was impossible where the infringing material was not being stored on
32
a server maintained by Verizon, but rather was stored on an individual user's computer.
Furthermore, when the DMCA was enacted, peer-to-peer software was not yet in existence and
Congress did not consider such a technological development when it enacted it. 33 The Court
reasoned that enacting new laws to cover peer-to-peer networks was34 for Congress to act on and
the Court would not expand the DMCA to protect copyright owners.
The decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was followed by a similar
case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit where the RIAA sought enforcement of
a subpoena acquired under § 512(h) of the DMCA.3 s Similar to Verizon, the ISP Charter
Communications was merely acting as a conduit between users and was not storing any of the

§ 512(h).
26 § 512(h)(2)(C).
27 In Re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 246-247 (D.D.C. 2003); In re Verizon Internet
Servs.,
25

Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2003); see, Alice Kao, Student Author, RIAA v. Verizon: Applying the
Subpoena Provision of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405 (2004); see also, Jordana Boag, Student
Author, The Battle of Piracyversus Privacy: How the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is
Using the DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct (DMCA) as its Weapon Against Internet Users' Privacy Rights, 41
CAL. W.L. REV. 241 (2004).
28 Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d at 24, 26. (D.D.C. 2003).
29
[d. at 45.
30 Recording Indus.

Assn. ofAm., Inc. v. Verizon InternetServs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. 2003).

31 Recording Indus. Assn. ofAm., Inc., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1233.

32 [d. at 1235.
33 Id. at 1238.
34

[d.

35 Recording Indus. Assn. ofAm. v. CharterCommun. Inc. In re: Charter Communications, Inc., Subpoena

Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2005).
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allegedly infringing material on their servers. 36 The Eighth Circuit adopted the D.C. Circuit's
holding that § 512(h) does not allow a subpoena to be issued where an ISP merely acts as a
conduit between two users and does not store any of the allegedly infringing material.3 7 The
Eighth Circuit also noted that it was the role of Congress to expand the provisions of the DMCA
38
to include peer-to-peer networks.
Since these rulings, the RIAA has made no other attempt to obtain information on alleged
copyright infringers through the subpoena provision of § 512. 9 Without the subpoena power,
the RIAA may still bring John Doe actions in the courts to discover
the identities of alleged
40
infringers, but these actions are more difficult and time consuming.
The decisions by the D.C. and Eighth Circuits demonstrate the reluctance of the courts to
expand legislative acts addressing online copyright infringement where the statute does not
specifically provide for such protection. 4 1 Technological innovation appears to be outpacing
congressional legislation to protect copyright owners. Nowhere is this more clearly detailed than
in the peer-to-peer litigation and attempts by copyright owners to shut down online sharing
between individual users.
B. The RJAA Sues Individual File-Sharers
The RIAA, in an attempt to scare off current and potential file sharers, sued thousands of
individuals for sharing copyrighted works online. This strategy generated bad press for the
RIAA and branded them greedy and heartless, with headlines relaying cases of children and
grandparents forced to pay fines for activity they did not know was illegal or were unaware that
was occurring on their computers. 4 2 In one extreme case, the RIAA sued a dead grandmother
who detested computers. 43 The intention of the RIAA in such suits was to slow down and
eventually stop illegal music-swapping. According to one study, the RIAA may not have
achieved its intended effect of slowing the peer-to-peer activity. 44 Contrary to reports from the
RIAA that the growth of file-sharing networks had been stalled, research conducted from 20022004 showed that peer-to-peer volume had not dropped. In fact, the research indicated that if
there had been any change at all, it was an increase in activity. 4 5 The difficulty in accurately
measuring peer-to-peer volume arises from the fact that peer-to-peer networks have begun to
36 Id. at 775.
37 Id. at 777.
38Id. at 777; see, David Gorski, Student Author, The Future of the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct (DMCA)
Subpoena Power on the Internet in Light of the Verizon Cases, 24 Rev. Litig. 149 (2005).
39 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Subpoena Database Query Tool, http:iiwww.eff.org/iP/P2P/riaasubpoenas
(accessed Aug. 20, 2005).

40 Gorski, supra n. 38 at 158.

41 Id. at 166.
42 See, Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People, http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-v-thepeople.php
(accessed Aug. 20, 2005).
43 Associated Press, Music Industry Sues 83-year Old Dead Woman, Boston.com News, Feb. 4, 2005,

http://www.boston.comnews/odd/articles!2005/02/04/music industry sues 83 year old dead woman
(accessed Aug. 20, 2005).
44 Thomas Karagiannis, Andre Broido, Nevil Brownlee and Michalis Faloutsos, Is P2PDying or Just Hiding?,
http:'www.caida.org/outreachipapers/2004/p2p-dying/p2p-dying.pdf

45 Id.

(accessed Aug. 20, 2005).
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camouflage their activities. Whereas, in the early days of peer-to-peer networking it was easy to
discern the46 amount of activity occurring, today there are new technologies and methods to shield
detection.
II. Empirical Findings about Effects on the Market and the Sony Decision
Are copyright owners and the music industry protecting their copyright by shutting down
online file swappers? They may be protecting their distribution right to the copyrighted material,
but recent empirical studies have shown that trading music online does not decrease record sales
and may, in fact, increase them. 47 Over a 17-week period in 2002, two researchers, OberholzerGee and Strumpf, monitored 1.75 million downloads on OpenNap (an open source Napster
server). They compared the sales of almost 700 albums (that had the downloaded songs on them)
that were reported from Nielsen Soundscan to arrive at the conclusion that there was no
relationship between online sharing and album sales. 4 8 Oberholzer-Gee further notes that in the
final two quarters there was an increase in music sales coupled with an increase in the popularity
of file-sharing. 49 The research found that individuals using peer-to-peer networks to download
music were using it to download a few songs rather than entire albums, thus suggesting that peerto-peer activity works similar in manner to the radio. 50 Oberlozer-Gee stated that most of the
illegal file-sharing originated in countries that do not have a good history of protecting an
owner's copyright and that to shut down file-sharing
from the United States would have minimal
51
effect on the worldwide network of file-sharers.
In a worst-case scenario analysis, Harvard and University of North Carolina researchers
found that illegal file-sharing reduced album sales by less than two million, with an overall
reduction of sales for the same time period of 139 million - representing a reduction of little
more than one percent (1.4). 52 According to the researchers, this means that online file-sharing
has no effect on record sales from a statistical point of view. 53 In 2002 a Jupiter research study
showed that people who participated in online file-sharing were seventy-five percent more likely
to purchase music than those who did not. 54 The RIAA blames the fifteen percent decline in the
number of CD's shipped from 2000 - 2002 on illegal file sharing of copyrighted works (despite
46

[d.

47 Felix Oberholzer and Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis

(March 2004), available at http://www.unc.edui-cigar/papers!FileSharing March2004.pdf (accessed Aug. 20,
2005). See also, Kevin Featherly, Long-Time File-Swappers Buy More Music, Not Less - Update, Newsbytes,
http://www.bizreport.com/newsi3337 (accessed Aug. 20, 2005), Apr. 25, 2002.
41 See, Sean Silverthorne, Music Downloads: Pirates or Customers?, HBS Working Knowledge,
http:'hbswk.hbs.edu/item.ihtml?id-4206&t-innovation (accessed Aug. 20, 2005), June 21, 2004.
49 Id.
50 Id.

51Id. Oberholzer-Gee notes that further research needs to be done on the reasons behind why peer-to-peer users
tend to download individual songs rather than entire albums. If this is a result of slow internet speed, he
concedes this could have an effect on the recording industry once users gain access to faster ways to access the
Internet, such as broadband. Once an individual can download an entire album, this would be more likely to
replace album sales.
52 See, David McGuire, Study: File-SharingNo Threat to Music Sales, Washington Post,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi mONTQ/is2004March29/ai n6097501 (accessed Aug. 20, 2005),
March 29, 2004.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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the fact that in the first two years of popular file-sharing, CD shipments increased). 55 The
president of the RIAA stated in 2003 that, "There's no minimizing the impact of illegal filesharing. It robs songwriters and recording artists of their livelihoods, and it ultimately
56
undermines the future of music itself, not to mention threatening the jobs of tens of thousands."
The gloom and doom prophecy brings to mind a similar statement made in 1982 by Jack
Valenti, then President of the MPAA:
"But now we are facing a very new and a very troubling assault on our fiscal security, on
our very economic life and we are facing it from a thing called the video cassette recorder
and its necessary companion called the blank tape. And it is like a great tidal wave just
off the shore. This video cassette recorder and the blank tape threaten profoundly the lifesustaining protection, I guess you would call it, on which copyright owners depend, on
which film people depend, on which television people depend and it is called copyright.
•I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as

the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone. '5

Quite the opposite of being an assault on film producers' fiscal security, the VCR created an
entirely new industry from which films could make money after their run in the theaters or on
television. In 1982 the MPAA faced what they believed to be a threat to the livelihood of their
industry due to technological innovations. The VCR was a boon to the movie industry by
increasing moviemakers' profits and creating a new forum in which films could be shown.
The concern over the VCR and its possible use as a copyright infringement device
culminated in the Sony case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.58 The Sony case involved
Betamax video tape recorders (VTRs), an earlier form of the video cassette recorders. 59 The
VTR allowed users to record, fast forward through commercials and make numerous copies of
television programs and movies broadcast over the air. 60 The owners of the copyrights brought
suit against the Sony Corporation claiming that Sony was liable for the alleged copyright
61
infringement committed by its customers because it marketed its VTR products to consumers.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California found against Universal
and denied it any of the relief it sought. 62 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the
District Court's ruling and found that Sony had committed contributory copyright
infringement. 63 The Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit's ruling and found that Sony was
64
infringement.
copyright
for
liable
not
51 Oberholzer and Strumpf, supra note 47 at 1-2; see also, Kevin Featherly, Long-Time File-Swappers Buy More

Music, Not Less, http://www.bizreport.com/news/3337 (accessed Apr. 25, 2002).
56 Cary Sherman, File-Sharingis Illegal. Period,USA TODAY, Sept. 19,
2003.
57

See, Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488,
and H.R. 5750 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin, ofJustice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary,97th Cong. 8 (1983) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion Picture Association of America,

Inc.).

51 See, Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
59

Id. at 420.
[d. at 422-423.
61
[d. at 420.
62 Id.
60

63 id.
64

Id. at 421.
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The Court found from the trial court proceedings that the primary use of the VTR was for
"time-shifting," or recording a program so one can watch it at a later time.65 The Court reasoned
that this expanded the audience of a television program and did not detract from the copyright
owner's rights. 66 The central issue the Court addressed was whether Betamax was capable of
commercially significant non-infringing uses. 67 The Court noted that Universal and Disney
represent well below ten percent of programs available on television and that there were many
other copyright owners that found nothing wrong with the practice of time-shifting for private
home use. 68 The Court further noted that some producers of television programming felt that
allowing home users to make copies of their programs actually increased the value of their
69
copyright
and,
thus,
expressly allowed
the recording
of theiruse
programs.
reason,
the
70
Court found
that
a commercially
significant
non-infringing
of the VTRFor
didthis
exist.
The Court detailed an analysis of the Fair-Use Doctrine to determine whether
unauthorized time-shifting was considered copyright infringement. 71 A fair use analysis involves
four considerations in determining whether an act of alleged copyright infringement qualifies as
a under fair use:
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

72

The Court focused on the fourth aspect of fair use and stated that a "use that has no demonstrable
effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited
in order to protect the author's incentive to create." 73 Since, presumably, ensuring an author's

incentive to create is a primary objective of the Copyright Act, use of a work that does not
interfere with the market for the work will not interfere with the artist's incentive to create and
should be permissible under the Fair Use Doctrine. The Court further said that an accusation of
copyright infringement for a non-commercial use required a showing that the use is harmful or
that it will have a negative impact on the market for the copyrighted material.7 4 The Court

specified that the commercial harm need not be present, but that some future commercial harm
must exist by a preponderance of the evidence. 75 Universal Studios
failed to meet this burden of
76
time-shifting.
to
regard
with
harm
future
or
present,
past,
showing
id.
id.
67 Id. at 442.
61 Id. at 443.
69 Id. at 447.
70
Id at 456.
65

66

71

Id.

72

17 U.S.C. § 107. (2005).
Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 450.

73Sony
74

[d. at 451.

75id.
76

id.
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III. Online Music-Swapping Cases: Napster, Aimster and Grokster;
Did the Courts Go too Far?
The technology at issue in peer-to-peer copyright infringement cases did not exist when
Sony was decided in 1984. Peer-to-peer systems function by enabling users to connect to one
another to share and download files on one another's computer. The user begins by downloading
the necessary software to connect to other users. 77 The software may maintain an index and
search library (like Napster) or may have a more decentralized function (like Aimster and
Grokster).
There are various gradations of decentralization that a software provider may consider
that will affect the speed and efficiency of the system. The Napster system was not completely
decentralized. It enabled users to conduct file searches and transfers through a centralized file
server. 78 Napster was susceptible to secondary copyright infringement because of this centralized
function, which, while providing a valuable service for its users, enabled Napster to monitor
infringing activity. The more centralized 79
a peer-to-peer system, the more exposed it will be to
liability.
infringement
secondary copyright
A. Napster is shut down.
Given the emphasis the Court placed in its fair use analysis on the effects of the
marketplace, a review of the District Court's opinion in Napster is appropriate.
Using
observations of actual file sharing behavior to determine the impact on sales, the empirical
analysis study found that file sharing had only a limited effect on record sales. 80 Although
downloading music could serve to replace the purchase of music, there are other alternatives to
what might occur as a result of file-sharing. 8 1 For one thing, individuals could discover music to
which they otherwise would not have been exposed, thus promoting new sales. 82 Furthermore,
most individuals who download music are not likely to have purchased the music in the absence
of file-sharing. 83 According to the study, five thousand downloads would be required to replace
a single album sale using the most pessimistic specification. 84 The study further found that high
selling albums benefited from file-sharing and that the less popular albums showed no
statistically significant decline in sales as a result of file-sharing. 85 If these recent findings are
correct, they would have had a significant impact on the fair use analysis detailed by the District
Court in Napster.
A&M Records, along with seventeen other record companies filed suit against Napster
for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement and sought an injunction to prevent
77
71

See, Kevin Michael Lemley, ProtectingConsumersfrom Themselves: Alleviating the Market Inequalities Created
by Online Copyright Infringement in the EntertainmentIndustry, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 613 (2003).

Id. at 628.

See, In re Aimster Copy.. Litig.. 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); A&MRecs., Inc. v. Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
80 Oberholzer and Strumpf, supra note 47 at 4.
"lid.at3.
82 Id.
79

13

[d. at4.

4 Id. at 3.

" Id. at 3-4.

5 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 36

Copyright © 2005, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

Napster from enabling others to download music without the express permission of the copyright
owner.8 6 The concept of secondary liability for copyright infringement is not explicitly provided
for in the Copyright Act. Rather, the courts established the concepts of contributory and
vicarious liability. 87 Contributory copyright infringement means, "one who, with knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another. ' 88 In other words, if one encourages or assists another with copyright infringement, that
person will be liable for contributory copyright infringement. 89
Vicarious copyright
infringement means that one has supervisory ability over an infringer and has a direct financial
90
interest in their activity.
Napster argued to expand the Sony defense to cover the downloading of MP3 files by its
users. 9 1 Napster did not collect fees from its users and did not profit from the downloading of
music, although the court noted that it had plans to profit from its user base through email,
advertising, and direct marketing of Napster products. 92 Napster was aware of the massive
uploading and downloading of copyrighted works on their system. 93 Napster argued that there
was a non-infringing component of their service, the promotion of new artists. 94 The court found
that this encompassed a small percentage of what Napster was being used for and that it was not
a factor of their business strategy until litigation made it desirable to pursue. 9 5 Napster attempted
to argue that their service could be used for "space-shifting," that is, uploading music from a
purchased CD to the site and transferring it to another location, such as the office. 96 However,
the court felt this was unlikely, as a user would have to leave their computer on while they
traveled to the other location
to download the music and that this was an insignificant portion of
97
business.
and
Napster use
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court's finding that
Napster failed to demonstrate that it was capable of commercially significant non-infringing
uses. 98 The Ninth Circuit noted that the District Court erroneously focused on Napster's current
uses, rather than the proper analysis under Sony: whether the item at issue is capable of noninfringing uses, not whether it is currently being used in such a non-infringing manner. 99 The
Ninth Circuit further ruled that Sony meant that a computer system operator would not be liable
for infringing activity merely because the system allowed it to be used as such if the operator had
no knowledge of the infringing activity.100 Unfortunately for Napster, the Ninth Circuit found
that it did have actual knowledge of the infringing activity, particularly after receiving notice on
86

A&MRecs. Inc. vNapster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

87 Gershwin Publ'g. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2nd Cir. 1971).
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89 Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998).
90Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162.
91 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
92 Id. at 902.
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December 3, 1999 from the RIAA that the copyrights of more than 12,000 songs had being
infringed. 101
Under the vicarious liability analysis, the District Court found that Napster had the ability
to and failed to police users from sharing copyrighted material. 102 Turning a blind eye to the
infringing activities of its users did not shield Napster from vicarious copyright liability. 10 3 The
Ninth Circuit found that the District Court failed to note the limits of Napster to "control and
patrol" - which was limited because the files being uploaded were only initially scanned to
determine that they were in the proper MP3 format, not to determine the material contained
therein. 104 However, using the search indices (assuming the user correctly labeled the file) and
Napster's ability to terminate any user's account
for improper use, it could have policed the
10 5
material once it was loaded onto the system.
The District Court addressed the business structure of the record companies, noting that
they received royalties from sales of its sound recordings and that Napster did not pay the record
companies any royalties for the songs that were downloaded from Naptster's site.10 6 The court
made the assumption that those who were downloading copyrighted songs would have purchased
the songs had the Napster service not been available, thus depriving record companies of
royalties they would have received from such purchases. If the Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf
empirical data mentioned above is correct, however, this would not be a valid assumption.
Therefore, compensating the record companies would, in effect, constitute a double payment.
The court goes into detail that the real profit for the record companies is derived from
their "hit" or popular recordings. 10 7 Thus, this would suggest that if less popular music is
negatively impacted in sales by online file-sharing, the peer-to-peer forum could serve as a
means to increase the popularity of the music.
At the time of its decision, the court had two conflicting analyses of the effects of online
music swapping on record sales. Using college-student surveys, the court found that use of
Napster was likely to reduce CD sales, despite the fact that surveys are necessarily prone to
errors since they must rely on the honesty of those filling out the survey. 1 °8 An individual's
behavior and what he or she believes that behavior to be can be very different. Relying on
surveys alone is insufficient to determine the true effect of file-sharing. Additionally, these
surveys may not have been an accurate representation of all potential music purchasers (and
would have overstated the harm done to the record industry) since they were completed by
college students with lots of free time and limited funds. This decision was particularly poignant
for Napster since the ruling against them effectively shut down its business.
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To make a determination about the validity of a defense for Napster, the District Court
addressed the two tests employed in Sony: (1) whether a staple article of commerce is capable of
commercially significant non-infringing uses and (2) whether the alleged copyright infringement
is protected under the fair use doctrine. 109 The court finds that the commercially significant use
of Napster is the unauthorized downloading and uploading of copyrighted music. 110 The court
does not consider the possibility that this music swapping could increase record sales, which
would benefit the copyright owners, reward their creativity, and encourage them to continue
making music, which are some of the main goals of copyright protection.
Copyright owners do have the right to determine how their works are distributed, but it
seems counterintuitive (in a scenario where the copyright owner desires to sell their work to the
public) to prevent behavior that, in fact, benefits authors and makes their work more profitable.
Furthermore, the majority of music files traded online are not copyrighted works that an author
does not want released. Where copyright owners do not want their work distributed to the
public, they would have a stronger case against the online music swappers. Otherwise, peer-topeer networks provide an alternate distribution method for copyright owners to gain exposure
and turn a profit.
Under the four part analysis for fair use, the first factor could lean in favor of Napster if it
could be shown that online music-swapping does not detract from CD sales. The court noted
that if a use is non-commercial, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the market for the
copyrighted work is adversely affected by such use.111 The court further noted that the majority
of Napster users do not turn around and sell the music they download for profit. It also noted that
the downloading and uploading of MP3 files is not private use (as the recording of a television
show in your home was found to be private use in Sony).l12 The second factor leans in favor of
the record companies since the nature of sound recordings are creative and entertaining. 113 The
third factor also leans in favor of the record companies, since it is undisputed that file-swappers
download an entire song or the entire copyrighted work. 14 The fourth factor would tend to favor
a finding of fair use if the empirical data that online music-swapping does not lead to a decrease
in album sales is correct. 115 In deciding against Napster's fair use defense, the Court relied on
potentially mistaken and inconclusive evidence produced by the music companies from college
student surveys. 1 16 It also relied on the raised barrier to entry into the market for record
companies for online music downloading to arrive at its decision. 117
The final point about a barrier raised to entry in the market is not convincing. If the
record companies are unable to compete with Napster or other similar services, they should
either find a way to work with them or adjust the amount charged to download a song that is both
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acceptable to the consumer and profitable for the copyright holder. 118 Record companies were
slow to realize the popularity and incredible distributive possibilities that arose from providing
and downloading music online. The record companies may be prevented from adequately
investing in such a stream-lined distribution method because of previous contracts and
agreements with the traditional distributors.
The court then addressed Napster's fair use arguments for sampling, space-shifting, and
the authorized use of new artists' works. 1 9 Sampling occurs when a user makes a temporary
copy of a copyrighted work before purchasing. 12 Space-shifting occurs when a user accesses a
sound recording he or she already owns. 12 1 The court dismissed sampling as a way that users
may avoid paying for the copyrighted work and notes the possibility that the user, once having
downloaded a copyrighted work, may continue to distribute sampled music to millions of other
users.12 2 The court distinguished sampling songs on Napster from recording television shows in
Sony by noting that television viewers are able to watch a show free of charge whereas record
companies almost always charge customers for the ability to listen to their music. 123 This
analysis ignores the fact that most television viewers must pay a monthly fee to be able to watch
the majority of programs. Moreover, while one who records a television program is unlikely
to
24
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The court relied on an incomplete survey provided by the recording companies. The
survey was inadequate in its scope because it failed show that there would be an adverse effect
on the market for copyrighted works if use were to become widespread. 125 Napster provided its
own survey that concluded that users do not use MP3 files as a substitute for CDs and that
twenty-eight percent of Napster users had purchased more CDs since they began using
Napster. 12 6 The court dismissed Napster's report as unreliable and stated that it does not rebut
the record companies' evidence of harm. 127 The court further stated that even if use of Napster
1t8

Runes has experienced some success in their business model of offering songs to download at $0.99 a song.
They might find that a lower cost per song could lead to an increase in the total number of downloads and an
increase in the ultimate profit. A few dollars seems a small price for consumers to pay to avoid facing a suit by

the record companies and potentially thousands of dollars in fines. However, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf
found that paid digital downloads account for less that two percent of total industry revenues, an amount
slightly greater that the statistical difference that could be attributed to the displacement of record sales for

digital downloads (which the researchers noted was inconclusive anyway). Amici Curaiae Br. of Felix
Oberholzer-Gee and Koleman Strumpf Amici Curaiae in Support of Respondents [hereinafter Oberholzer-Gee
and StrumpfBriel], Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster, Ltd, 125 S.Ct. 686 (2004) (referencing Phil
Gallo, 2004 is Music to Diskeries' Ears, Daily Variety, Jan, 6, 2005, at I and Band Radio, Report: Average CD
Price Drops 4% in Q3 2004 to $12.95, Nov. 15, 2004, at http://www.bandradio.comnews/?id-2236 (accessed
Apr. 9, 2005)).
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led to an increase of CD sales, this does not give a copyright infringer the right to infringe, thus
sampling would not be considered fair use. 128 This seems counter-intuitive to the goals of
providing copyright protection to artists: rewarding them for their creative works and
encouraging them to produce more.
The court refused to apply the staple article of the commerce doctrine because Napster
maintained continuous control over its users, unlike the manufacturers in Sony, who did not
interact with its customers beyond the manufacture and sale of its VTR. 12 9 The staple article of
commerce doctrine provides an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement action when a
manufacturer is selling a product that is capable of commercially significant non-infringing
uses. 130 The court found that this type of control by Napster led to a conclusion of contributory
copyright infringement. 131 It was further stated that Sony is inapplicable due to Napster's role in
enabling unauthorized copying and distribution of copyrighted works. 132 An injunction was
issued against Napster, prohibiting it from "engaging in, or facilitating others in copyright,
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyright 13musical
compositions
3
owner."
rights
the
of
permission
express
without
...
and sound recordings
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals largely upheld the injunction granted by the District
Court with an amendment to the scope of contributory liability. 134 Napster was not liable for
contributory copyright infringement just by its mere existence, but rather only if actual notice
had been provided and Napster failed to remove the infringing material. 13 5 The Ninth Circuit
placed the burden on the plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of their copyrighted material
36
being infringed upon prior to Napster being required to remove the infringing material. 1
B. Aimster: The Seventh Circuit'sApplication of a New Fair Use Formula
Aimster's peer-to-peer system was based upon America On Line's ("AOL") Instant
Messaging service, whereby individual users could chat with one another once they had installed
the necessary software. Once downloaded, Aimster's software enabled users logged onto a chat
room to share files with one another. 13 7 The Aimster server did not record copies of files shared
138
among users, but rather collected and organized information obtained about its users.
Use of the Aimster peer-to-peer software did not cost anything. However, it did provide
a service called "Club Aimster" for a fee where a member could download the top forty most
popular songs. 139 The Seventh Circuit noted that it was not relevant whether the copyright
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owners lost money due to the online sharing of their copyrighted music. 14 0 The reason is because
an effect on the market for the copyrighted work is the determination necessary for a fair use
analysis, not where infringement of a copyright is shown. 14 1 A copyright owner will not be able
to recover damages without a showing of a decline in the marketability
of their copyrighted
42
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The Seventh Circuit opinion added a balancing test of costs and benefits to the Sony
Doctrine of significant non-infringing uses. The forty most popular songs that Club Aimster
members paid $4.95 a month to retrieve are copyrighted materials, however, Aimster was not
granted permission to share and distribute these materials for a monetary fee. 14 3 Since Aimster
did not charge for downloading its file-sharing software, nor sell online advertising space, this
was the sole money-producing aspect of its service. 144 The court found the infringing activity
sufficient to shift the burden of production of substantial non-infringing use to Aimster. 14 Since
Aimster did not provide any evidence of a non-infringing use for its service, the court ruled that
it failed to meet its burden of production and could not use the Sony defense. 146 The court
discussed five potentially non-infringing uses of Aimster, but dismissed them by stating that
Aimster failed to present evidence that anyone utilized the Aimster software in this way. 147 The
court also qualified just how likely a user is to use the Aimster service in this non-infringing
manner, thus creating a new requirement to be met that was not applied in the Sony case. 148 The
Seventh Circuit found that the lower court was correct in granting the preliminary injunction and
shutting down Aimster's service. 149
C. Grokster: Why the Courts Should Not Interfere with the Sony Doctrine.
The Computer and Communications Industry Association and Internet Archive Amicus
Curiae brief (hereinafter, "Computer Brief'), authored by Peter Jaszi, offers an insightful view
into why the courts should leave the Sony doctrine alone. 150 The Grokster case, on appeal from
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, involves a decentralized file-sharing system that does not
have supervisory control over the content shared (as Napster did).' 5 ' The Ninth Circuit found
that Grokster was not liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement because its
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However, later in its ruling, the court mentions the monetary damage that would be incurred by the recording

industry due to file-sharing taking replacing the sales of albums as a reason to uphold the grant of preliminary
injunction. Id. at 655. The court seems comfortable jumping to this automatic conclusion without any
significant empirical evidence provided by either side.
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system was capable of substantial non-infringing uses. 152 The copyright owner would bear the
burden of showing that a defendant had reasonable knowledge of infringing material.1 53 In its
reasoning, the court held that if a defendant was able to show significant non-infringing uses of
its product, constructive knowledge would not be implied. 154 This decision directly conflicted
with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Aimster, where the court found that a defendant was
responsible for providing evidence of non-infringing uses and that this finding of non-infringing
use must meet some undefined level of
activity to shield the defendant from vicarious and
155
contributory copyright infringement.
The Seventh Circuit, contrary to the Ninth Circuit, insisted upon using a second test once
significant non-infringing use was shown, that the defendant must provide evidence about usage
and frequency of such uses. 156 The Seventh Circuit focused on the "legitimate unobjectionable
purposes" requirement of the Sony holding, whereas the Ninth
Circuit focused on the "capable of
157
Sony.
under
requirement
uses"
substantial non-infringing
The Computer Brief details various non-infringing uses of the peer-to-peer networks that
have an extremely beneficial effect on society, creating a new gateway to an enormous amount
of information in an easily accessible format. The brief notes that libraries use the peer-to-peer
networks for programs such as LOCKSS ("Lots of Copies Keep Stuff Safe") to ensure access to
electronic journals and avoid reliance on a publisher's server. 158 This system enables the library
59
to maintain its own database as well as share the information with other subscribing libraries. 1
Peer-to-peer servers also provide a more stable platform on which information can be
shared that is not vulnerable to the types of attacks that a centralized server faces.160 Peer-topeer networks can also help reduce the traffic caused from the dissemination of large files or a
great number of small files that use up the bandwidth and slow transmission. 16 1 The scientific
community can also benefit from the peer-to-peer platform, creating a decentralized location
where information and data can be shared instantly and across great distances, without using up
the bandwidth and resources normally needed to share such vast amounts of information. 162 The
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has also utilized the peer-to-peer technology to
63
distribute its collection of 600,000 hours of television and 500,000 hours of audio recordings.1
This incredible amount of information sharing cannot be shut down to protect the copyrights of
152 Id.
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concerned musicians and movie producers when there are alternative methods to protect their
rights.
In addition to educational and scientific discovery uses, peer-to-peer networks are
beneficial for providing widespread, easy access to classic works of history, religion, politics and
literature that might otherwise be difficult to obtain due to its obscurity or inaccessibility. 164 This
levels the playing field by providing a researcher in the middle of nowhere with the same
resources as someone in a major metropolitan city or at a research university. Use of peer-topeer networks also creates a new platform for the dissemination of an individual's speech and
ideas. 165 In a developing society where people have become more and more removed from one
another, with the elimination of central squares and common meeting grounds, the peer-to-peer
network provides a safe space where individuals can come together and exchange ideas and
information using audiovisual and other technology available to them.
There are a number of popular musicians that encourage the online trading of their live
performances. 166 Both authors and musicians have reaped the benefits of sharing their creative
works online. 167 There are new services being created, such as Weed which reward its users for
sharing music while encouraging sales and compensating artists for their work. 168 Other
distribution methods, such as Creative Common licenses, are structured to encourage open legal
distribution 69which compensates the artists while adding to the pool of creative works available to
the public. 1
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf also filed an amicus brief for the Grokster case before the
Supreme Court in support of Grokster. They stated that findings that file-sharing led to a
reduction in sales of its copyrighted materials had been materially overstated and were
speculative, based on their own findings from their empirical research. 170 It is interesting to note
that Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf are disinterested parties in this debate, are not funded by either
side, and will receive no benefit from the outcome of this case, quite unlike either the copyright
owners or Grokster.171
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf further note some of the mistaken assumptions made by the
phone survey studies that the copyright owners relied upon. The first: individuals surveyed
would have purchased the same number of albums if file-sharing did not exist. 172 The two
researchers state that file-sharing is particularly attractive to those individuals who are cash-poor
but time-rich and these individuals would likely purchase fewer albums in the absence of filesharing. 173 The second: where a drop in sales of albums cannot be linked to problems with the
economy, linking such discrepancy to file-sharing and the replacement effects such activity has
164
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for the potential consumer is weak.174 Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf point out that music industry
sales are cyclical and that this type of decline is far less than the type of decline that was seen in
the 1970's. 175
Some alternative explanations for the decline in music sales could be the increased
competition from DVDs, video games, and cell phones, and the fact that consumers are spending
more of their disposable income on these newer technologies. 176 Sales of DVD and VHS tapes
increased by over a staggering $5 billion between 1999 and 2003, a similar time frame to that
during which file-sharing behaviors saw a steady increase. 177 Combine that with the following
shifts in pricing of the various technologies and the decline in music sales begins to seem
inevitable. Since 1999 (1) CD prices increased ten percent while (2) DVD prices decreased by
twenty percent and (3) the price of DVD players decreased by 60 percent.17 8 The final two
factors rarely noted by the recording industry is the decline in shipments that major vendors such
as Wal-Mart have had on the industry coupled with consumers completing the replacement
purchasing activities that occurred due to the switch from cassette tapes to CDs. 1 7 9 Once a
consumer has replaced his older record albums in a CD format, there is no longer a need for him
to continue purchasing at the same volume. The aggregate effect of numerous consumers
completing their music purchase in the new CD format could look like a decline in sales, when
what is occurring is the market is stabilizing to a more normal and accurate sales volume.
Conclusion
A solution to the problem of online music piracy is not to go after the peer-to-peer
creators and networks that encourage the dissemination of information.
Attacking the
technology developers does not increase social welfare, but rather slows innovation. Moreover,
other legitimate uses of peer-to-peer technology - such as the distribution of works that are in the
public domain, as well as works that have been granted express permission by the copyright
owner may be deterred. This harms the fledging artists as well as other established artists who
want their music to be shared and heard. The music industry should be spending its time and
money searching for a way to root out the copyright infringing users and work with the peer-topeer file-sharing developers rather than against them.
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